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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF COLUMBIA 
Petitioner, 
against 
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, 
BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner of New York State 
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 
NEW YORK BOARD OF PAROLE, ANDREA W. 
EVANS, Chairwoman of the New York Board of Parole, 
Respondents, 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice 
Law and Rules. 
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AFFIRMATION IN 
OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND IN FURTHER 
SUPPORT OF 
VERIFIED PETITION 
Orlee Goldfeld, an attorney admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of New 
York, affmns the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106: 
1. been asking for a lawful parole hearing for 
more than a year now, and Respondents have used every delay tactic possible to deny him. To 
date, he has appeared before the Parole Board five times, 1 and he has had three parole hearings, 
none of which was conducted in accordance with the law. He has filed three administrative 
appeals .and two previous Article 78 proceedings, raising the same issues as those herein. 2 At 
this point, Mr. - has served more than 25 months, well beyond the guideline range of 12-18 
1 On two of those occasions, the paro- ·ssioners discontinued the hearing, once because the 
commissioners did not bring with them Mr. file, and the other because two of the commissioners recused 
themselves with no explanation. 
2 None has been decided on the merits (Exh. Thereto, collecting decisions of administrative appeals and 
previous Article 78 proceedings; see also Exhibits N and S to the Goldfeld Affi.nnation, executed on the 51ll day of 
March 2013, previously filed in this proceeding in support of the Verified Petition (''Goldfeld Aff.")). The 
administrative appeal ofMr. November 2012 is pending. 
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months shown on his Inmate Status Report. He completed his minimum sentence 9 months ago. 
He has no prior criminal history and no disciplinary infractions while in prison. One is left to 
wonder what, if any, legitimate basis and purpose there is for his continued incarceration.3 
2. I am Of Counsel to the firm of Hollyer Brady LLP, counsel for Mr. -
make this affirmation in opposition to Respondents' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 
32ll(a)(7) ("Motion") and in further support ofMr.~erified Petition ("Petition"), 
seeking inter alia an Order (1) vacating Respondents' unlawful determination denying Mr. 
- parole application and (2) directing Respondents immediately to release Mr.--
to conduct a new parole hearing in accordance with the laws of the State ofNew York, and other 
relief specified in the Petition. The statements herein are true to my knowledge, except as to 
those matters alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. 
THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIES 
3. Respondents make a half-hearted attempt to deny the applicability of the 
exception to the mootness doctrine, since they concede that two of the three factors are present in 
this case. 
4. First, Respondents do not deny - nor can they- the likelihood of repetition, 
because the very issues raised in the Petition already reoccurred at Mr. ~ovember 2012 
parole bearing. These issues will undoubtedly reoccur again at his next scheduled hearing in 
August 2013. Thus, this factor of the exception is established. 
MI.- continued incarceration is so important to Respondents lhat they leaked the transcript of his 
first parole hearing to the media the day after lhe hearing (Exh. U hereto), and they issued a press release stating that 
-
he was a~>ain denied parole in November 2012 (Exh. V hereto). On the same day, they issued a press release that 
as granted parole (available at 
tp occs.ny.gov/PressRel/20 12/Hevesi_ Granted_Parole.html> ). 
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5. Second, Respondents do not deny that this issue repeatedly evades judicial 
review, because they have successfully thwarted judicial oversight of their actions for more than 
a year now, and they have the unilateral power to continue to do so. In order to prevent a court's 
examination of their actions, all Respondents need to do (and have done) is schedule another 
unlawful parole hearing, and then oppose any petition or appeal on the grounds that Mr.-
claims are mooted by virtue of the later hearing. Respondents are also under no obligation to 
rule on Mr.- administrative appeals, and simply ignore them (Exhibit Thereto and 
Goldfeld Aff. Exhs. N and S). Thus, this factor of the exception to the mootness doctrine is also 
established. 
6. Instead, Respondents commit the majority of their Motion trying to persuade the 
Court that the issues raised in the Petition are not substantial or novel, even though Respondents 
concede that no appellate court has determined whether Respondents have complied with the 
legislative amendments that went into effect on October 1, 2011. 
7. The cases cited in their Motion (O'Donnell Affirmation ("Aff")" 10) are 
inapposite. First, in Matter of Amen v. New York State Division of Parole, 100 A.D.3d 1230 (3d 
Dep't 2012), a case in which the inmate appeared for a parole hearing before the statutory 
amendments became effective, the court stated: "petitioner's argument regarding the retroactive 
application of recent amendments to Executive Law§ 259-c(4) is not preserved for our review." 
In Matter ofHamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 101 A.D.3d 1549 (3d Dep't 2012), 
the Court makes no mention of Executive Law§ 259-c(4). The Hamilton case has no bearing on 
the issues raised herein, since the denial of Hamilton's parole was made in November 2010-
well before the amendment to Executive Law § 259-c( 4). 
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8. As set forth herein, the issues raised in the Petition are novel and substantial, 
including whether the decision to keep Mr. - incarcerated was irrational bordering on 
impropriety, and merit this Court's review under an exception to the mootness doctrine. 
RESPONDENTS CONTINUE TO IGNORE THE 
AMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE LAW§ 259-c(4) 
9. Quite remarkably, Respondents try to paint a picture that the amendments to 
Executive Law§ 259-c(4) and Correction Law§ 71-a that became effective in October 2011 
were of little or no consequence. 
10. For example, they gloss over the change in the language in Section 259-c(4) 
(emphases added): 
Pre-Amendment Executive Law§ 259-c(4) Amended Executive Law§ 259·c(4) 
"Establish written guidelines for its use in ''Establish written procedures for its use in 
making Parole Board decisions as required by making Parole Board decisions as required by 
law, including the fixing of minimum periods law. Such written procedures shall 
of imprisonment or ranges thereof of different incor12orate risk and needs urinciules to 
categories of offenders. Such written measure the rehabilitation o1' [!Crsons 
guidelines may consider the use of a "risk and appearing before the board, the likelihood of 
needs assessment" to assist members of the success of such persons uuon release and 
state Board of Parole in determining which assist members of the state Board of Parole in 
inmates may be released to parole determining which inmates may be released to 
supervision." parole supervision." 
11. The change to the language of the statute is significant, moving from guidelines to 
procedures that incorporate risk and needs principles to measure rehabilitation and likelihood of 
success, and cannot be ignored. 
12. It is disingenuous at best for Respondents to feign no understanding of the 
meaning of"risk and needs principles" (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 15), given that Respondents -
and- both testified about them at the Committee Hearing (Goldfeld Exh. K), and risk and 
needs principles have been studied in the field of corrections for decades. 
4 
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Correction Law § 112( 4), which was also amended on March 1, 2011, provides: 
commissioner and the chair of the parole board shall work jointly to develop and 
tm}:HerneiJtt, as soon as practicable, a risk and needs assessment instrument or instruments, 
shall be empirically validated, that would be administered to inmates upon 
reception into a correctional facility, and throughout their incarceration and release 
to community supervision, to facilitate appropriate programming both during an inmate's 
incarceration and community supervision, and designed to facilitate the successful 
integration of inmates into the community. 
Are we to believe that they don't understand what "risk and needs" means in this statute either? 
14. In addition to claiming to not understand the meaning of "risk and needs 
principles," Respondents remarkably state: "Executive Law§ 259-c(4) dictates neither how new 
'written procedures' are to be established, nor in what manner 'risk and needs principles' are to 
be incorporated within them." (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 15). 
15. This statement suggests that Respondents have no understanding of the structure 
of government or the responsibility imposed on them as an administrative agency by New York's 
Constitution, the Executive Law, and the State Administrative Procedures Act ("SAP A"). Thus: 
a. Executive Law § 259-c( 11) states that the Board shall: 
make rules for the conduct of its work, a copy of such rules and of any 
amendments thereto to be filed by the chairman with the secretary of state. 
b. Article IV, Section 8 ofthe New York State Constitution provides: 
No rule or regulation made by any state department, board, bureau, officer, 
authority or commission, except such as relates to the organization or internal 
management of a state department, board, bureau, authority or commission shall 
be effective until it is filed in the office of the department of state .... 
c. Executive Law§ 101-a provides the definitions and requirements for agency rule 
making, and Executi~e Law § 1 02 includes the requirements of filing and 
publication by the secretary of state. 
5 
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d. SAP A § 203(]) requires that rules. and official procedures of state agencies and 
boards be published in the state register by flrst sending a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (SAP A § 202( 1 )) and then by filing a notice of adoption along with 
the rule for publication (SAP A § 202(5)}. 
16. Administrative agencies are tasked with developing rules, which includes 
"procedures" (see SAPA § 102(2)(a)(i)), that are consistent with their enabling legislation. 
17. Respondents had a deadline of October 1, 2011 to comply with amended 
• 
Executive Law§ 259-c(4) in accordance with the above-listed procedures. They didn't. 
THE EVANS MEMORANDUM lS NOT THE REQUISITE PROCEDURES 
18. Respondents try to establish their compliance with Executive Law § 259-c( 4) by 
pointing to the Evans Memorandum (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 17 and Exh. B thereto). While not 
stating outright that the Evans Memorandum is the procedures, Respondents claim that it "serves 
as" the Procedures (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 17). "Serve as" is not the same as "is." 
19. First, neither the Evans Memorandum, nor anything else purporting to constitute 
the procedures required by the statute, is in Title 9 ofNYCRR Part 8000, where the rules and 
regulations that implement and govern the functions, powers and duties of the Parole Board are 
required to be set forth. See 9 NYCRR § 8000.1. Second, neither the Evans Memorandum, nor 
anything else purporting to constitute the procedures required by the statute, has been filed with 
the Secretary of State. If the Evans Memorandum actually constituted the required procedures, 
its filing with the Secretary of State would be mandatory, and the Respondents' failure to do so 
renders their parole decision arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d 24, 
28 (1979). 
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20. Moreover, the Evans Memorandum amounts to nothing more than an 
acknowledgment that the Executive Law had been amended. Chairwoman Evans herself 
acknowledged in her testimony a month after she wrote the Memorandum that the procedures 
have not yet been developed (Exhibit K to Goldfeld Affirmation in Support of Verified Petition, 
dated March 5, 2013 ("Goldfeld Aff.")). 
21. In addition, in a response to a FOIL request by former Chairman of the Parole 
Board Edward Hammock, Respondents stated onApril18, 2012 as follows: 
The written procedures to be implemented pursuant to the amendment of Executive Law 
§259-c( 4) are currently being developed by the Board and Department staff. 
(Exhibit Whereto (emphasis added)). This carne 6 months after Respondent Evans wrote her 
Memorandum, and further goes to prove that it is not the procedures. 
22. In order to try to bamboozle the Court into believing that the Evans Memorandum 
"serves as the procedures referenced in the amended Executive Law§ 259-c(4)," Resp<:>ndents 
append a group of recent trial court decisions that found that the Evans Memorandum is the 
procedures (O'Donnell Aff. Ex.hs C-F).4 
23. None of the decisions relied upon by Respondents even mentions Executive Law 
§§ 101 -a, 102, 259-c(4), 259-(c)(l l), SAPA §§ 201-207, and New York State Constitution, 
Article IV, § 8, and they therefore do not establish that the Evans Memorandum suffices to 
comply \\ith these laws. 
24. It is unlikely that the prose petitioners even raised these arguments, given that it 
is not bard to imagine that pro se inmates have limited or no access to the legal resources 
required to ascertain the full scope the Board's and DOCCS's obligations under these laws. 
Noticeably absent is the decision in Cotto v. Evans, No. 139796,2013 WL 486508, 2013 NY Slip Op 
30222[U] (St. Lawrence Cty. Jan. 22, 201 3), which found "nothing in the record to suggest that the written 
procedures mandated by the amended version of Executive Law§ 259-c(4) were established." (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. 
P). 
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25. In addition, all of the pro se inmates in Respondents' cases are incarcerated for 
committing heinous, violent crimes- some while they were on parole. None of those inmates' 
offenses is remotely similar to Mr- situation: a first-time non-violent offender of a 
single E-Felony with no prior criminal history and no disciplinary infractions while in prison. 
26. Thus, these cases are not dispositive. 
TAPANDCOMPAS 
27. Maintaining their posture of "business as usual," Respondents take the position 
that the March 2011 amendments did not change the law and that they were not even required to 
prepare a TAP for Mr. - (O'Donnell Aff., 23). This position contradicts DOCCS's Fact 
Sheet and Respondents 
the following questions: 
testimony, see generally Petition~~ 72-78, and begs 
28. Why did the Legislature and Governor approve a change to the law? What was 
the purpose of the amendment to the statute requiring the development of the TAP (see 
Correction Law§ 71-a and Executive Law§ 112(4))? Why were Respondents····· 
- called to testify about the amendments and the status of their compliance therewith before 
the Assembly Committee on Correction (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. K)? Why did DOCCS develop the 
TAP and pilot it in three correctional facilities (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. Kat 19-20)? 
29. According to the Evans Memorandum, the TAP "instrument, which incorporates 
risk and needs principles, will provide a meaningful measurement of an inmate 's rehabilitation." 
The amendment to Executive Law§ 259-c(4) requires procedures that "shall incorporate risk and 
needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board" and the 
likelihood of success upon release. Nothing in the Executive Law or the Evans Memorandum 
says that an Inmate Statu~ Report measmes sebabilitati on ~d likelihood of success UEOn releass_ 
8 
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and presumably it does not because the law was amended to provide for development of an 
instrurnent(s) that measures rehabilitation (Executive Law§ 112(4)). 
30. How can there have been compliance with the statute if nothing was used to 
measure Mr. - rehabilitation or likelihood of success and no TAP was required to be 
developed, as Respondents assert (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 23)? Use of the Inmate Status Report as 
suggested in the Evans Memorandum does not comply with the statutory requirements of 
Executive Law§ 259-c(4) and renders Mr. - arole bearing unlawful. 
31. While Respondents have discretion in making parole determinations, that 
discretion is neither unlimited nor immune from judicial scrutiny. Discretionary parole release 
determinations are reviewable if they are not done in accordance with law and/or if there is a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See, e.g., Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470 
(2000); Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 (3d Dep't 2006); Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614 (3d 
Dep' t 2006). 
32. Correction Law§ 805 provided Mr. - with a presumptive right to~ 
released as of June 18, 2012, due to his receipt of a Certificate of Earned Eligibility (cEE"). ~ _ __.,-
The only discretion that Respondents had was limited to making a lawful detem'lination that, if 
released, Mr. - is likely to reoffend and that rus release is not compatible with the welfare 
of society. That determination was supposed to be made in accordance with New York Statutes 
and based upon the evidentiary record before Respondents.5 It wasn't. 
33. Respondents take the position that they are not even required to prepare a 
COMPAS for Mr. - (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 25). Nothing in the Evans Memorandum suggests 
5 Nothing submitted in support of Respondents' Motion suggests that the Commissioners bad any evidentiary 
basis for denying Mr. - parole application or any facts that contradicted the overwhelming evidence in 
support of his release, which fwther supports his claim that the Respondents action was irrational bordering on 
impropriety. 
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that a COMP AS is the instrument that incorporates risk and needs principles to measure the 
rehabilitation of persons or likelihood of success upon release. 
34. In fact, the Evans Memorandum does not set forth any procedures for use of the 
COMP AS. The only mention about COMP AS is that training was afforded to board members 
about its usage in relation to aT AP. A statement that training was offered is not a procedure. 
35. Mr.- has no previous criminal history, no disciplinary infractions, and has 
agreed to life-long penalties that prevent him from committing any securities-related crime in the 
future (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. A). Mr. - COMP AS showed the lowest possible risk of 
reoffending (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. F). 6 
36. With no procedures in place that tell the Board how to assess Mr.- risks 
and needs, the Board could not rationally fmd a reasonable probability that Mr. 
reoffend. The Evans Memorandum offers no guidance and certainly no procedures on how to 
apply the COMPAS. 
37. What is the procedure when there is no TAP and a there is a CEE, as in Mr. 
- case? 
38. What is the procedure when an inmate like Mr. - has a CEE and the 
COMP AS shows the lowest possible risk level of reoffending? 
39. Quite clearly, the Evans Memorandum is not the procedures required by 
Executive Law§ 259-c(4). 
40. How is the Court even supposed to detennine if a decision denying parole to an 
inmate with a CEE and the lowest risk level on the COMP AS was made in accordance with the 
6 PerhaP.s in an attempt to create an issue about his success upon release, Respondents' redacted three 
sections of Mr. - COMPAS on the copy they attached to the Motion (O'Donnell Aff. Exh. G): #24 
(substance abuse risk), #29 (employability upon release), and #30 (financial problems upon release). Mr .•• 
attached an unredacted COMP AS to the Petition, which shows that he is not at risk for substance abuse problems, 
and that there are no employability or financial problems upon release (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. F). 
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law when Respondents have knowingly and admittedly failed to establish procedures for making 
such determination? 
41. Respondents' decision denying parole in the absence of the required written 
procedures is tantamount to never even giving Mr.- lawful hearing in the first place. 
42. They acted beyond the scope oftheir power in conducting the August 21 , 2012 
parole hearing without written procedures and without a TAP for Mr.-
43. Respondents also acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and so irrationally that their 
actions border on impropriety based on the overwhelming evidence that Mr has the 
lowest possible risk to reoffend including his: Certificate of Earned Eligibility, COMP AS score, 
no previous criminal history, age, payment of $19 million to the Common Pension Fund, and the 
imposition of life-long bans and prohibitions making it impossible for him to commit any 
securities-related crime in the future. See generally Petition, 19-2 I, 27-31. 
44. Accordingly, the issue of whether Respondents acted in compliance with the 2011 
amendments to the Executive and Correction Laws is substantial and novel and should be 
considered by this Court as an exception to the mootness doctrine. The Motion should be denied. 
RESPONDENTS DID NOT SERVE THE MOTION 
45. The Motion shouJd also be denied due to Respondents' failure to serve in 
accordance with the CPLR. 
46. According to their Affidavit of Service, Respondents served a copy of their 
Motion directly upon Mr. - by maiJ on March 22,2013. Mr. - received the papers on 
the afternoon ofMarch 26, 2013. He was unable to reach his counsel until the morning of March 
27, 2013 to advise that a Motion returnable March 29, 2013 bad been made. 
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47. Mr. - counsel immediately contacted Respondents' counsel, Brian J. 
O'Donnell, who admitted that service had not been effectuated properly. Mr. O'Donnell sent a 
copy of the Motion papers by email at !0:44a.m. on March 27, 2013 (Exhibit X hereto). 
48. This purported service does not comply with either: CPLR 2214(b) ("A notice of 
motion and supporting affidavits shall be served at least eight days before the time at which the 
motion is noticed to be heard."); CPLR 21 03(b) (requiring service upon an attorney for a 
represented party); CPLR 2103(c) (requiring the addition of five days for mail service upon a 
party); or the Administrative Rules of the Unified Court System (no order of the Chief 
Administrative Judge allowing electronic service in Article 78 proceedings pending in Columbia 
County). 
49. Accordingly, the Motion is defective and should be denied on procedural grounds. 
ANSWER WITHIN FIVE DAYS 
50. Respondents should be required to answer the Petition within five (5) days of the 
denial ofthe Motion in accordance with CPLR 7804(f). 
51. Here, Respondents ask for 30 days to answer. There is no justification for 
needing 30 days to answer, and Respondents set forth no basis for requiring so much time. In 
fact, Respondents have already addressed the bulk of the Petition's arguments regarding 
Executive Law § 259-c( 4) and Correction Law § 71-a in the Motion.~ 
52. Balancing the harms that will be caused by an extension of time shows the 
irreparable damage to Mr.- Every day that Mr.~pends incarcerated beyond his 
Minimum Sentence Date causes irreparable harm, as that time can never be recaptured. On the 
other hand, Respondents can show no harm by being required to act in accordance with the 
CPLR. 
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53. Moreover, Respondents are represented in this case by Mr. O'Donnell, who 
apparently worked on the Ortiz case (O'Donnell Aff. Exh. D). The Ortiz case raised issues 
similar to those raised herein, which Mr. O'Donnell characterizes as "not substantial" 
(O'Donnell Aff. ~ 7). Therefore, Mr. O'Donnell is more than adequately prepared to respond to 
Mr. - substantive arguments in a timely fashion. 
54. Respondents' request for a period of time far greater than that accorded by the 
CPLR to answer the Petition should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. requests that the Court deny Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, 
order Respondents to answer within five days, and then enter Judgment pursuant to .Article 78 of 
the CPLR for the relief requested in the Petition, and grant such other and further relief as may 
be deemed just and proper. 
Dated: New York, New York 
Aprill, 2013 
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ee Goldfeld, Esq. 
HOLL YER BRADY LLP 
60 East 42°d Street, Suite 1825 
New York, New York 10165 
Tel: (212) 706-0248 
Fax: (646) 652-5336 
goldfeld@hollyerbrady.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
